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LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . LIV
The case is noteworthy also on more general grounds. It
shows that, with some imagination, the courts can indulge in law
reform . In Re Casselman, the Court of Appeal managed by its
own devices to bring one aspect of the law of dower into the
twentieth century.
JANE MATTHEWS GLENN*
DISCOVERY-PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE.-One of the most troublesome ques-
tions relating to the permissible limits of discovery is the extent
to which a party may obtain production of documents developed
in the course of his opponent's preparation of the case . The issue
has been sharpened in the context of attempts by one party to
examine prior to trial the statement that he had earlier given to
the other party or his agent when the latter was investigating the
incident in question . The point has occupied the attention of
Canadian courts over the past few years,' the most recent con-
tribution to the jurisprudence being the decision of the Alberta
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Strass v. Goldsack, Dux
and Gosset and Canadian Indemnity Company (Third Party) .'
The plaintiff in that action sued for damages for personal injuries
incurred when the automobile in which she was a passenger was
involved in an accident with another vehicle. The defendants
were the owners and drivers of both automobiles. The insurer
of two of the defendants was added as a third party pursuant to
the Alberta Insurance Act,3 thereby permitting it to defend
against the plaintiff's claim without admitting liability on the
policy to its insured. Upon completion of the pleadings, a notice
to produce documents was served on the defendants and the
insurance company. The latter refused to produce a statement
made by the plaintiff herself on the ground that there existed a
privilege in respect of it . The insurer had engaged an adjuster to
*Jane Matthews Glenn, of the Faculty of Law, McGill University,
Montreal.
' Flack v. Pacific Press Ltd (1970), 74 W.W.R . 275, 14 D.L.R . (3d)
334 (B.C.C.A .) ; Wasilkowsky v. Borysowich, [1972] 2 O.R . 621 (H.C.J .),
aff'd without written reasons, June 22nd, 1972 (C.A .) ; Bourbonnie v.
Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 445
(Alta S.C., App . Div .) ; also see Britten v. F. H. Pilcher & Sons, [1969]
1 All E.R . 491 (Q.B .D .) .
2 [19751 6 W.W.R. 155, (1976), 58 D.L.R . (3d) 397 .
3 R.S.A ., 1970, c. 187, s . 306(14) .
1976]
	
Commentaires 423
investigate the accident, in the course of which, he obtained a
written statement from the plaintiff as to the circumstances of
the accident .
It was common ground that the statement was taken by the
adjuster in anticipation of possible litigation arising out of the
automobile collision and for the use and advice of solicitors . The
sole question for decision by the court was whether any privilege
prevented the plaintiff from securing production of the statement.
In a four-to-one decision, the court held that a statement given
by one party to his adversary was not protected by any privilege.
The result is not surprising as it is in accord with recent decisions
in British Columbia 4 and Ontario.° What makes the case inter-
esting is the unique reasoning which led the court to its
conclusion . The court failed to honour the clearly defined border
separating a party's right to discovery and production, from the
countervailing claim of privilege by his opponent . In keeping
with the modern general trend to broaden the scope of discovery
and production of documents,s this court ran roughshod over
some of the well-established principles of legal professional
privilege.
The solicitor-client privilege is . the oldest of the privileges
for confidential communications, dating back to the sixteenth
century.? Originally rooted in the tenet that the integrity and
honour of the solicitor should not be tarnished by forcing dis-
closure of professional communications made to him, the rationale
gave way to the view that the privilege was necessary, not for
the preservation of the solicitor's reputation, but for the protec-
tion of the client ." It was based on the assumption that full, frank
and candid disclosure by the client to his solicitor was necessary
for effectual legal assistance which could be guaranteed only if
the client's confidences were protected from disclosure .9 As the
rule of privilege developed, however, the breadth of protection
4 Flack v. Pacific Press Ltd, supra, footnote 1 .
5 Wasilkowsky v . Borysowich, supra, footnote 1 .
6Perini Ltd v . Parking Authority of Toronto (1975), 6 O.R . (2d)
363, 52 D.L.R . (3d) 683 (C.A .) ; Duncan v . Royal Bank of Canada, [1971]
3 W.W.R. 311, 19 D.L.R . (3d) 334, at p . 338 (B.C .S .C .) ; Rubinoff v .
Newton, [1967] 1 O.R . 402 (H.C.J.) ; Turta v . C.P.R. et al . (1951),
2 W.W.R . (N.S .) 628, at p . 631 (Alto S.C .) .
7 Wigmore, on Evidence, Vol . VIII (McNaughton Rev., 1961), §2290.
8Ibid ., McCormick on Evidence (1972), p . 175 .
9 See the cases collected in Sopinka and Lederman, The Law of
Evidence in Civil Cases (1974), p . 158 .
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took on different dimensions . It expanded beyond just communi-
cations passing between the client and solicitor and their respec-
tive agents, to encompass communications between the client or
his solicitor and third parties if made for the solicitor's informa-
tion for the purpose of pending or contemplated litigation.10
Although this extension was spawned out of the traditional
solicitor-client privilege, the policy justification for it differed
markedly from its progenitor . It had nothing to do with clients'
freedom to consult privately and. openly with their solicitors ;
rather, it was founded upon our adversary system of litigation by
which counsel control fact-presentation before the court and
decide for themselves which evidence and by what manner of
proof they will adduce facts to establish their claim or defence,
without any obligation to make prior disclosure of the material
acquired in preparation of the case." Accordingly, it is somewhat
of a misnomer to characterize this aspect of privilege under the
rubric, "solicitor-client privilege", which has peculiar reference
to the professional relationship between the two individuals.
Although long steeped in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence, it
was only in 1947, in the case of Hickman v. Taylor,12 that the
Americans firmly developed something comparable to this second
branch of the legal professional privilege, (hereinafter, for con-
venience, referred to as the "anticipation-of-litigation" privilege)
which they termed the "work-product" doctrine. Murphy J.
explained its basis in the following oft-quoted passage: 13
In performing his various duties, . . .it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion
by opposing parties and their counsel . Proper preparation of a client's
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. . . . This
to Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia (1876), 2 Ch . D. 644,
at pp. 649-650; Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co . v. Quick (1878), 3 Q.B .
315, at pp . 321-323 ; Re Strachan, [1895] 1 Ch . 439, at pp . 444-445;
Wheeler v. Le Marchant et al . (1881), 17 Ch . D. 675, at p. 682; Susan
Hosiery Ltd v. M.R .R ., [1969] 2 Ex . C.R . 27, at pp . 31, 33-34; Flack
v. Pacific Press Ltd. supra, footnote 1, at p. 336; Cross on Evidence
(4th ed., 1974), p. 249.
"Cross, op. cil., ibid., p. 253.
1 (1974), 67 S.Ct . 385, 329 U.S . 495.
13Ibid., at pp . 510-511 (U.S .) . Some judges have imported the
"work-product" rule into the Canadian context although the "anticipation-
of-litigation" privilege is sufficiently broad to envelop all the material
protected by the Hickman doctrine : See Re Evans and Banffshire Apart-
ments Ltd (1968), 70 D.L.R . (2d) 226, at p. 228 (B.C .S.C .) .
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work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, cor-
respondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless
other tangible and intangible ways- aptly though roughly termed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the "work product
of the lawyer" . Were such materials open to opposing counsel on
mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain
unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be
his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases
for trial . The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.
And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served .
It must be recognized that the protection given by the United
States federal courts to a lawyer's work product arose in the
context of the procedural principles of discovery and did not fall
under the umbrella of the traditional attorney-client privilege. 14
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hickman v . Taylor,
while acknowledging that information obtained by an attorney in
preparation of his case was outside the limited scope of the
American attorney-client privilege, held that such. information
may nevertheless have a qualified immunity from discovery under
this newly articulated doctrine . The protection was qualified in
that such material would be discoverable only upon a substantial
showing of a necessity or justification .' -5
The strictures of the adversary system have been consider-
ably loosened by the modern practice of discovery and production.
There has been an increasing tendency to allow for greater dis
closure at the discovery stage so as to lessen the degree of
surprise at trial and to bring to light all facts to be considered in
a decision of a case upon the merits . 16
It is in this context that Strass v. Goldsack et al. should be
considered, for the conflicting policies behind discovery and priv-
14 " . . . the protective cloak of [attorney-client privilege] does not
extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while
acting for his client in anticipation of litigation . Nor does this privilege
concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings pre-
pared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it
is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories ." Per Murphy J . in Hickman
v. Taylor, ibid ., at p . 508 (U.S .) .
151bid ., at pp . 509-510 . Now see R.26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, as set out in (1970), 48 F.R .I . 457 .
16 For example, see Ohl et al . v. Cannito, [1972] 2 O.R. 763 (H.C .J .)
and Spatafora v . Wiebe, [1973] 1 O.R. 93 (H.C .J .) in which it was held
that a defendant in a personal injury case must disclose observations
made of the injured plaintiff .
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ilege collided in that case without successful resolution by the
court.
Three sets of concurring reasons favouring disclosure of the
party's statement were delivered. Clement J.A . pointed to the
expansive provisions of the Alberta Rules of Practice relating to
discovery and production of documents. They, of course, promote
the general interest in the administration of justice giving a litigant
access to all relevant and material facts thereby ensuring that
parties have an opportunity to put before the court everything
which will assist it in resolving the dispute. The only impediment
at the discovery stage to full disclosure is the claim of privilege
of which both Clement and Moir JJ.A . took a restrictive view .
Clement J.A . acknowledged that direct communications between
a client and his solicitor, as well as documents created by the
solicitor himself in the course of his professional duties to his
client, are privileged and need not be revealed . That is where he
would end the shield. Because a statement taken from the
opposite party falls outside the ambit of privilege as defined by
Clement J.A., then prima facie, no privilege attaches to it. In his
rush, however, to limit the obstacles in the way of a party seeking
production, he completely ignored the well-entrenched "anticipa-
tion-of-litigation" privilege. Instead, without explanation, he
relegated it to the ash can, saying that privilege for any other
type of communication, including documents gathered by or for
a solicitor from other sources, will be recognized only if they
now satisfy the conditions for the establishment of a privilege as
laid down by Wigmore as follows : 17
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed .
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties .
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.
Because the claim of privilege did not satisfy any of these condi-
tions, he ordered production . Looking ahead, he added: is
"Former decisions on privileged documents must now derive their
authority or guidance from their apparent conformity to the
conditions, and on this view many must be passed over."
17 Wigmore, op . cit., footnote 7, §2285.
is Supra, footnote 2, at p. 160.
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D. C. McDonald J. (ad hoc) in his thorough and carefully
developed reasons, expanded upon this new test under which
communications are henceforth to be examined whenever a claim
of privilege is raised . Sanction for the use of Wigmore's four
criteria in Canada, he said, was given by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Slavutych v. Baker,l9 although conceding that Spence
J. who delivered the judgment in that case, dealt with a claim
of privilege over a communication entirely different from the
kind of statement confronting him. He inferred that because
Spence J., in obiter dicta, considered the communication in ques-
tion in Slavutych v. Baker in light of the Wigmore test, therefore
in the future, "in deciding whether or not a privilege attaches to
a particular communication or class of communication Canadian
courts not only may but ought to consider whether Wigmore's
four conditions are satisfied" .20
Issue may be taken with this conclusion . To begin with, the
Supreme Court of Canada did not expressly sanction the use of
Wigmore's criteria in determining in all cases whether or not a
claim of privilege over a communication will succeed. The circum-
stances were so different that a transposition of the principles
from that case to the Strass situation is misleading.
Slavutych dealt with the situation where B who has received
a communication in confidence from A attempts' to, use the
confidential information in . proceedings against A. The case
centred around a tenure form sheet which Slavutych, an Associate
Professor at the University of Alberta had filled out. He had
been requested to give his opinion of another professor who was
being considered for tenure. An arbitration board then used the
information which Slavutych submitted as the basis for his own
dismissal, holding that he was guilty of a serious misdemeanour
in using intemperate language against a fellow faculty member.
Slavutych appealed on the ground that the tenure form sheet
was to have been kept strictly confidential and was to have been
destroyed after the Tenure Committee had met. The Supreme
Court of Canada concluded that the tenure form sheet was
inadmissible in evidence and accordingly quashed the ruling of
the Arbitration Board. The court, however, spoke of the confiden-
tial privilege as existing apart from the law of evidence. Spence J.
19 [19751 4 W.W.R. 620, 55 A.L.R. (3d) 224. Clement J .A. was of
the same view . Supra, footnote 2, at p. 159 (W.W.R .) .
2o Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 166-167 (W.W.R .), 422 (A.L.R .) .
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paid lip service to Wigmore's four criteria but did not need to
apply them to the case before him. He said :'-' 1
. . . [C]onsidering the matter only an evidentiary one and under the doctrine
of privilege as so ably considered in Wigmore the confidential document
should be ruled inadmissible, . . .I am, however, of the opinion that
this is not to be considered as a matter o£ the application of the
doctrine of privilege in the light of evidence.
What Spence J. was alluding to was that the statements made
in confidence by Slavutych were inadmissible not because of any
evidentiary principle of privilege2L but because of the equitable
doctrine which may be invoked to prevent a breach of confidence
by prohibiting the revelation of a confidential statement by one
of the parties to the communication-23 or someone who has
obtained a copy of it,24 to the detriment of the party who initially
made the statement. Injunctive relief may be obtained by a party
to restrain another from using against him in a proceeding a
confidential communication that he had made, or, to prevent its
general publication.L5 The basis for this equitable principle relates
21 Supra, footnote 19, at pp . 626-627 (W.W.R .), 229 (D.L.R .) .
'='-' In fact, the House of Lords has refused to recognize confidentiality
alone as comprising a separate head of evidentiary privilege: See Alfred
Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs and
Excise (No. 2), [1973] 3 W.L.R. 268, at p. 285, [1973] 2 All E.R . 1169,
at p. 1184 (H.L .) ; Norwich Pharinacal v. Commissioners of Customs and
Excise, [1973] 3 W.L.R . 164, at p. 190, [1973] 2 All E.R . 943, at p. 969
(H.L .) ; Rogers v. Secretary of State for Home Department, [1972] 3 W.L.R .
279, [19721 2 All E.R . 1057, at pp . 1067, 1070 (H.L .) ; Cross, op . cit .,
footnote 10, p. 249. Also see Central Canada Potash Co. Ltd et al . v.
Attorney General for Saskatchewan et al . (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 7, at
pp . 39-40 (Sask. Q.B .) .
23 Terrapin Ltd v. Builders' Supply Co . (Hayes) Ltd et al ., [1960]
R.P.C. 128 (C.A .) .
2`1 Lord Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch . 469. An anomaly in the
law allows a party under this principle to enjoin someone into whose
hands the communication has fallen from using it ; yet if he delays until
trial to object to the admissibility of this improperly obtained evidence,
the courts will receive it : See Sopinka and Lederman, op. cit., footnote 9,
pp . 338-341; C. Tapper, Privilege and Confidence (1972), 35 Mod. L.
Rev. 83 .
°-'5 Argyll v. Argyll, [1965] 1 All E.R. 611 (Ch. D.) ; Prince Albert
v. Strange (1849), 1 Mac. & G. 25 ; Distillers Company Ltd v. Times
Newspapers Ltd, [1975] 1 All E.R . 41 . (Q.8 .D .) ; Attorney General v.
Jonathan Cape Ltd et al., [1975] 3 All E.R. 484, at pp . 494-495 (Q.B.D .) .
If, however, the disclosure relates to a matter of public concern or to
crime, fraud and misdeeds, then the courts might, in the public- interest,
refuse to prohibit publication : Initial Services Ltd v. Putterill, [1967] 3 All
E.R . 145, at p. 148 (C.A.) ; Hubbard et al . v. Vosper et al., [1972]
1 All E.R . 1023 (C.A.) ; Fraser v. Evans, [19691 1 All E.R. 8 (C.A .) .
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to the general duty to act in good faith.21, As Lord Denning said
in Seager v. Copydex,27 this jurisdiction "does not depend on
any implied contract . It depends on the broad principle of equity
that he who has received information in confidence shall not
take unfair advantage of it . He must not make use of it to the
prejudice of him who gave it without obtaining his consent" .2B
In addition to the general remedy of injunction, where the very
parties to the proceeding have agreed in advance that commu-
nications or documents exchanged between them would be treated
confidentially and not used for :any other purpose, the court will
rule against any attempt by one party to introduce such evidence
against the party who made the communication in reliance upon
the confidence29 That is what the Supreme Court of Canada did
in Slavutych v. Baker.
Spence J. however, went further and said that if it had been
necessary, Wigmore's prerequisites could have been successfully
invoked so as to extend the cloak of evidentiary privilege over
communications taking place within the private - confines of the
professor-tenure committee relationship . But, it is suggested that
this observation by Spence J. has no relevance to the circum-
stances in the Strass case . It is true that the Supreme Court of
Canada has, by this obiter dictum, implied that an evidentiary
privilege may now cover communications within confidential
relationships, other than that of solicitor-client which hitherto at
common law, has been the only professional relationship pro-
tected from enforced disclosure .3° Such claims to privilege will
now be analyzed under the microscope of Wigmore's conditions
and accordingly there may be a myriad of other relationships to
26 Fraser v. Evans, supra, footnote 25, at p. 11 . There has been
considerable conceptual uncertainty as to the basis on which this jurisdiction
is exercised. In addition to good faith, the courts have, at different times,
invoked principles of property, contract, bailment, trust, fiduciary rela-
tionship, and unjust enrichment as justification for the relief : See The
English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 58, Breach of Confidence
(London, 1974), pp . 10-11; G. Jones, Restitution of Benefits Obtained
in Breach of Another's Confidence (1970), 86 L.Q . Rev. 463.
27 [19671 1 W.L.R . 923 .
28 Ibid., at p. 931.
2s Terrapin Ltd v. Builders Supply Co . (Hayes) Ltd et al., supra,
footnote 23 ; Bell v. University of Auckland, [1969] N.Z.L.R. 1029 .
30 Wheeler v . Le Marchant et al., supra, footnote 10, at pp. 681-682.
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which the courts may now accord privilege.31 That is to be
welcomed if one believes that privilege should not be the private
preserve of the lawyer-client relationship and that others have a
valid claim to it as well . It is submitted, however, that it is to a
communication within an entirely different kind of relationship
from that existing in Strass v. Goldsack et al . to which Wigmore's
criteria have any application .
The policy bases behind the narrow solicitor-client privilege
on one hand and the "anticipation-of-litigation" privilege or
"work-product" rule on the other, are totally dissimilar and give
rise to different considerations .32 Although D. C. McDonald J.
recognized and articulated the distinction, he failed to keep them
separate when he applied Wigmore's conditions .
As mentioned at the outset of this comment, the modern
justification for the limited solicitor-client privilege was to encour-
age freedom of consultation by clients with their lawyers which
could be accomplished only if there was no fear that what
transpired between them would be open to scrutiny . All four of
Wigmore's conditions are met in respect of this relationship and
justify the privilege for it . It was Wigmore's view that if the
protection, which necessarily frustrates the ability of a court to
have before it all possible relevant information, is to be extended
to communications within other relationships, the four conditions
which he propounded had to be present. It is important to note
that the essence of this professional privilege is the confidentiality
of communication which is necessary for the preservation of a
socially beneficial relationship . In the crucible of Wigmore's four
conditions, if that useful relationship can be maintained only upon
the understanding that the communicant's confidences will be
protected, then the courts should not insist upon disclosure . The
focus of the protection, therefore, is upon the person making
31 "Not only does [Wigmore's test] provide a rationale : it also leaves
room by the third and fourth conditions for adaptation of the principle
to changing needs and conditions of society which is essential to the
proper function of the common law." Per Clement J .A ., supra, footnote 2,
at pp . 160 (W.W.R .), 415 (D .L.R .) . English courts have utilized a broad
discretionary power to keep out confidential communications emanating
from a particular relationship if "more harm than good would result from
compelling a disclosure or punishing a refusal to answer". Attorney-General
v. Mulholland, [1963] 1 All E.R . 767, at p. 773 (C.A .) ; Attorney-General
v. Clough, [1963] 1 All E.R . 420, at p. 425 (Q.B .D.) .
:t2 J. A. Gardner, Privilege and Discovery: Background and Develop-
ment in English and American Law (1965), 53 Geo. L. J. 585.
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the confidential communication. The privilege is reposed in him
and he is the only one who can waive it . 33
To Wigmore, the phrase "privileged communications" was
not to have reference to every communication but was intended
to describe those taking place within special relationships, usually
but not always professional, but always of value to society:
The privileged communication, as universally conceded, are those
made by persons holding a certain confidential relation-in particular,
that of husband and wife, attorney and client, - a fellow juror, and
government and informer . To these are added, in some jurisdictions,
the relations of priest and penatent, and physician and patient, and
occasionally sundry other additions have been attended 84
He did not design his conditions with "anticipation-of-litigation"
communications or "work-product" material in mind . His con-
ditions were enunciated well before the "work-product" rule
emerged from Hickman v. Taylor and when "anticipation-of-
litigation" privilege was not recognized in the United States . In
fact, McNaughton's 1961 revision of Wigmore's volume on the
subject of privilege35 stressed the importance of distinguishing
between the principle of privilege for confidential attorney-client
communications and the exemption of a party from discovery
of certain documents and prospective witnesses' statements. This
is the way it was put:3s
Thus, for example, two documents in the hands of an attorney may
be beyond reach of the opposing party-One, because it is a con-
fidential communication to the attorney by the client or his agent,
and the other because it is a communication to the attorney by a
prospective third-party witness. The reason for immunity in the former
instance is the present privilege [attorney-client privilege] ; the reason
in the latter is the totally unrelated rule exempting certain matters
from discovery.
Confusion can be avoided only if the two principles are kept within
their proper dimensions.
Similarly, the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its Report
to Parliament37 has set out in its proposed draft legislation, as
separate and distinct heads of privilege, a provision applicable to
33 With reference to the solicitor-client relationship, see Bell et al. v.
Smith et al ., [1968] S.C.R . 664; Stewart v. Walker (1903), 6 O.L.R . 495;
Shedd v. Boland, [1942] O.W.N . 316, aff'd at p. 346.
34 Wigmore, op . . cit., footnote 7, §2197.
35 Ibid.
3s Ibid., §2320.
37 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (1975) .
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professional relationships,"' another for lawyer-client communica-
tions,"y and yet another akin to the present "anticipation-of-
litigation" privilege, or "work-product" rule .4°
Wigmore's "privileged communications" test was aimed at
protecting the individual who spoke in confidence in a particular
relationship . It was not directed at the policy behind the "antic
ipation-of-litigation" or "work-product" rule which had its genesis
in the adversary system, protecting not the communicant but the
evidence-gathering solicitor and his client . 41
The fundamental flaw in D. C. McDonald J.'s reasoning,
therefore, is his conclusion that Canadian courts should now apply
Wigmore's four criteria to every communication over which a
privilege is sought, to determine whether a court should accede
to it.
Having taken this position, he then proceeded to analyze the
communication made by the party to the adjuster engaged by the
insurer of two of the defendants . He said that no privilege
attached because all four conditions had not been satisfied : the
communication had not originated in confidence ; there was no
"relation" between a party and the solicitor of the opposite party
whom the former may wish to sue; even if there were a "relation",
it was not one of special importance to the community so as to
be "sedulously fostered" ; and again, even if there were a "rela-
tion", it could not be said that it would be "injured" to any great
degree compared to the adverse effect upon the litigation if there
were non-disclosure of the communication.
38 Criteria similar to Wigmore's are embodied in the Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, ibid ., Evidence Code, s. 41,
which reads as follows: "A person who has consulted a person exercising
a profession for the purpose of obtaining professional services, or who has
been rendered such services by a professional person, has a privilege
against disclosure of any confidential communication reasonably made in
the course of the relationship if, in the circumstances, the public interest
in the privacy of the relationship outweighs the public interest in the
administration of justice."
"s Evidence Code, ibid ., s . 42(1) .
40 Evidence Code, ibid ., s. 42(2), reads as follows : "A person has a
privilege against disclosure of information obtained or work produced
in contemplation of litigation by him or his lawyer or a person employed
to assist the lawyer, unless, in the case of information, it is not reasonably
available from another source and its probative value substantially out-
weighs the disadvantages that would be caused by its disclosure ."
41 Cross, op . cil ., footnote 10 ; Wigmore, op. cil ., footnote 7, §2319;
McCormick, op . cil ., footnote 8, p. 201.
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What D. C. McDonald 7. has lost sight of is that it is not
the party who made the communication who is claiming the
privilege in the instant case . If it were, then perhaps Wigmore's
criteria would have some relevance. The privilege that is being
asserted here is the one vested in the defendants on whose behalf
the insurance adjuster has secured the statement for the purposes
of litigation . If there is a valid claim to privilege, it comes within
the "anticipation-of-litigation" basis or the- analogous "work-
product" rule and not Wigmore's concept of privileged com-
munications .
D. C. McDonald I. was aware of the ramifications of his
analysis because he then felt it necessary to consider whether
a Wigmorian privilege existed to protect statements made by a
stranger-witness to a party or his agent and taken for the pur-
poses of litigation. If it does not exist with respect to com-
munications passing between the parties or their agents, why
should it exist when a stranger-witness makes a statement to
a party?
Although acknowledging that the "work-product" rule as
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor was sufficiently wide to encom-
pass statements taken from witnesses in preparation for litigation,
D. C. McDonald J. believed that the rule should be limited to the
true "working papers "42 of the solicitor; that is, his own notes,
opinions, and memoranda to himself. Accordingly, he was of the
opinion that with respect to all communications, if privilege for
them is claimed, then it would be recognized only if Wigmore's
four conditions were met. He then examined the situation where
communications pass between a witness and a solicitor or his
agent in the context of Wigmore's tests and concluded that there
is good reason for a privilege to be recognized in such cases. His
analysis again implied that it is the witness-communicant who has
the privilege and that the rationale for protecting such communica-
tions is the encouragement it would give to witnesses to tell
truthfully what they observed. Using Wigmore's criteria,
D. C. McDonald 7. suggested that such statements are given in
confidence because witnesses would not otherwise wish to be
exposed to the risk of defamation actions, or at the very least,
embarrassment that would result from disclosure, and, further-
more unless such statements .are kept confidential, witnesses will
not be frank and candid in the information that they give . He
also suggested that the witness-solicitor or witness-adjuster rela-
42 Supra, -footnote 2, at pp . 171 (W.W.R .), 426 (D .L.R.) .
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tion is worth fostering and that the injury that would result to
such relationship by forced disclosure would be greater than any
benefit gained in furthering the administration of justice. But
again, the misconception is that it is the witness who will be
claiming the privilege. Quite the contrary . It is the adverse party
who is alleging that in preparing his case for trial he must be
free to investigate and collect his evidence without the prying
eye of his opponent looking over his shoulder . The "anticipation-
of-litigation" privilege would, of course, protect such statements
and it was unnecessary, and indeed incorrect, to use Wigmore's
test to come to the same conclusion.
It seems that D. C. McDonald J.'s reasoning resembles to a
great degree the kind of explanation that is afforded when a
court recognizes Crown Privilege, or more appropriately, a claim
that the public interest will be impaired by disclosure . With
respect to communications made to some department of the
government, disclosure is often resisted on the basis that revela-
tion will be injurious to the public interest or that it might frighten
away important sources of information which must be kept secret
for the proper functioning of the public service.43 Unlike private
privileges, this public privilege belongs not to any private party,
nor to any witness. It is usually asserted by the government¢¢
but it would appear that even in the absence of governmental
objection, the judge should prohibit disclosure if he feels it will
be harmful to the fabric of the state.45
On the merits, it cannot reasonably be argued that there is
a public interest at work when a witness makes a statement to a
party or his solicitor . The element of confidentiality is missing
entirely for the witness knows that he may find himself embroiled
in ensuing litigation. No undertaking is ever given to the witness
that his identity or his communication will be kept hidden . For
otherwise, what value is there in taking his statement? It is to be
used, to the witness' knowledge, in an attempt to resolve any
impending dispute between the parties to the event. Further-
more, witnesses are cognizant of the fact that they can be sub-
poenaed by any party at trial and be forced to testify as to what
they have observed . Thus there is no reason to believe that a
43 See S . 1 . Bushnell, Crown Privilege (1973), 51 Can . Bar Rev . 551 .
4 4 Duncan v . Cannnell, Laird & Co . Ltd, [1942] A.C . 624, at p . 638
(H.L .) .
45 Conway v . Rintn:er et al ., [1968] A.C. 910, at pp. 950-951 (H.L .) ;
Rogers v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra, footnote 22,
at p. 282 (W.L.R .) .
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witness, particularly to a motor vehicle accident, who generally
has no interest in the outcome of the litigation, would be less
than frank and candid in communicating with a party, his solicitor
or his agent. It bears no similarity to the common law privilege
which protects the identity of police informers which encourages
citizens to apprise police authorities of illegal activities . Without
the protection of anonymity, those vital sources, so necessary for
law enforcement, would dry up. As Lord Reid has said in Rogers
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department," ". . . it is obvious
that the best source of information about dubious characters must
often be persons of dubious character themselves".47 Witnesses
to motor vehicle accidents are not generally people who frequent
the fringes of the criminal underworld . No public interest is
therefore involved in statements passing between a witness and
a party or his solicitor or his agent.
Furthermore, D. C. 1VIcDonald J.'s application of Wigmore's
criteria to protect statements given by stranger-witnesses creates
another problem, if by so doing it is concluded that a witness
has a privilege over communications that he makes to a party.
It would mean that for all intents and purposes, since the witness
has that privilege, he can assert it if he is subpoenaed to . testify at
trial and any attempt to cross-examine him on his own previous
inconsistent statement would be foreclosed unless he waived the
privilege. This would be the consequence of concluding that the
privilege was reposed in the witness. That was obviously not
meant to be. There is a privilege in the situation but, it is the
traditional "anticipation-of-litigation" or "work-product" protec-
tion given to the adversary who is preparing his case for trial .
Accordingly, it is the adversary who can assert the privilege, not
the witness, and the adversary need not make prior disclosure
to the opposite party of any evidence that he has secured in
advance of trial. D. C. 1VIcDonald J.'s conclusion with respect to
the privilege in this situation is correct; it is his reasoning that
is questionable.
In his dissenting judgment Chief Justice McGillivray outlined
the development of the "anticipation-of-litigation" branch of the
legal-professional privilege and pointed out that any discussion
as to whether the communicant made the statement in confidence
or not is beside the mark, because it does not form the foundation
4#3 Ibid .
47 Supra, footnote 22, at p. 1061 (All E.R .) . Also see the speech of
Lord Salmon, at p. 1071, ibid .
436
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . LTV
of the common law protection enshrouding statements from
witnesses obtained in preparation for litigation . He said : 48
But at what point does the matter of confidentiality become of con-
sequence? Surely it is not whether the witness, be he an opposing
party or not, in giving a statement, or, indeed, an investigator in taking
a statement, as between the investigator and the witness thought it
was confidential . The confidentiality arises from the fact that the
statement is, in fact, obtained on behalf of the client for the advice
of a solicitor in connection with litigation anticipated or pending.
The fact that the person giving the statement has no reason to
think it confidential, has, in my view, precisely nothing to do with
the matter.
He concluded that because the statements from the party were
obtained for the advice of counsel in respect of anticipated litiga-
tion then there was a privilege against disclosure even though
the party did not intend that his statement to the defendants'
investigator be given in confidence .
Although McGillivray C.J.A .'s analysis is sound in dis-
tinguishing between the two types of privilege, he did not consider
whether in the circumstances of the Strass case such privilege
was waived . Privileges are not absolute and if the holder of the
privilege makes a voluntary disclosure or consents to disclosure
of any material part of a communication, then there will be
waiver and the privilege is lost . It has been recognized that if
documents otherwise protected by the "work-product" doctrine
have been disclosed to others with an intention that an opposing
party may see the documents, or by their disclosure have sub-
stantially increased the opportunity for the adversarial party to
obtain the information, the party who permitted the disclosure
should not be allowed at a later time to claim protection for the
documents on the ground that they were prepared in preparation
of litigation .} 9 In the Strass case, as in all cases where a party
makes a communication to the adverse party's agent, obviously
the evidence obtained by the adverse party coincides with dis-
closure to the former . It is instantaneous waiver . As soon as the
adversary obtains the statement he has disclosed it to the opposite
party for it is that very party who has made the statement. Thus
the majority holding in the Strass case that a statement made by
a plaintiff to an adjuster of the insurer of the defendants must
be produced to the plaintiff is consistent with the general prin-
4s Supra. footnote 2, at pp . 177 (W.W.R.), 402-403 (D.L.R.) .
49 C. A. Wright and A. R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
Vol. 8 (1970), s. 2024 ; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American
Brass Co . et al . (1967), 275 F. Supp . 146, at p. 148 (U.S.D.C.) .
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ciples of "anticipation-of-litigation" privilege or the "work-
product" rule and the waiver thereof.
Within the adversary framework, McGillivray C.J.A .
expressed another fear in permitting a party to have production
of his own statement that he had earlier made to the other side : 50
Is it to be given to him before examination for discovery or trial
so that he may tailor his evidence to be consistent? If he has been
consistent in his version of the accident, his statement cannot hurt
him. If he has a new version from that which he gave to investigators
immediately following the accident, why should not his new version be
tested by the production of the statement, not before he has given
evidence, but after, by cross-examination? The proceedings are adversary
proceedings .
This danger, however, is not just indigenous to production of a
party's own statement, as D'. C . McDonald J . rightly pointed out . 51
If this concern of a witness moulding his evidence to conform
with statements and documents in the possession of the opposite
side is to be viewed as a serious mischief, then, in order to
eradicate it, much, if not all, of our machinery of discovery and
production would have to be dismantled . Ono of the purposes
of discovery and production is to reduce the element of surprise
at trial by making both sides aware of the case each has to meet.
®f necessity therefore, both parties are apprised of the existence
of relevant documents which are exchanged before trial and thus,
there always is the apprehension that a party might attempt to
tailor his evidence to conform with the documents . It has,
however, never overcome the value to be gained by full discovery
and production .
Both Moir J.A . and Clement J.A . went farther in their
criticism of McGillivray C.J.A.'s point, and emphasized the need
to be fair to a witness and to promote the ascertainment of the
truth . They suggested that a party should be allowed to use, as
an aide-memoire, a document which he had previously made .
That would be of particular assistance to "the illiterate, the
uneducated or the disadvantaged or people whose native language
is other than English"52 who might not otherwise have retained a
copy of the statement . If one was seriously troubled about such
people then both' of these judges, to be consistent, would have
to advocate that all statements made by all witnesses, not just
50 Supra, footnote 2, at pp . 183-184 (W.W.R .), .408-409 (D.L.R .) .
Also see Britten v . F. H. Pilcher & Sons, [1969] 1 All E.R. 491, at p . 493 .
51Ibid., at pp. 172-173 (W.W.R.), 427-428 (D.L.R .) .
52 Ibid., at pp . .160, 165 (W.W.R.), 416, 421 (D.L.R .) .
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those made by a party, should be disclosed prior to trial.5`3 That
would, of course, fly in the face of not only the "anticipation-of-
litigation privilege" or "work-product" rule but D. C. McDonald
J.'s application of Wigmore's conditions to the statements given
by a stranger-witness .
Looking at the Strass case as a whole, the reasons of the
majority judges were innovative in the sense that they implied,
in obiter dicta that relationships other than solicitor-client may
be considered by Wigmore's conditions as of such importance
that confidential communications taking place within them will be
privileged . D. C. McDonald J.'s judgment, in particular, perhaps
best reflects the creativity of the common law in this respect.
Rather than adhering to the traditional inflexible view of the law
of privilege, he adopted an approach which allows a court to
pragmatically examine the relationship in question to determine
whether its societal benefit outweighs the harm resulting from
the suppression of relevant and probative evidence . The one
shortcoming of the majority judgments, however, is the failure
to come to grips with the policies behind the different types of
privilege and accordingly, this aspect of the law has been left in
a state of conceptual confusion.
S. N. LEDERMAN*
AIR LAW-WARSAW CONVENTION-INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.-An international conference
on air law was held at Montreal from September 3rd-25th, 1975,
under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Associa-
tion .) The main item on the agenda was consideration of some
draft articles designed to revise the cargo and mail provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, 1929, as amended by the Hague
Protocol, 1955 . The draft articles had been approved by the
53 Under R. 26(b) (3) of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra,
footnote 15, a party, as of right, may obtain production of his own state-
ment . Similarly, the statement of a non-party witness may be secured
by that witness without any special showing of need .
* S. N. Lederman, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
i Hereinafter referred to as ICAO .
Item 9, Provisional Agenda, W/H-CM Doc. No . 2. See also the
Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-14, Schedules I and III, for a
text of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
